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Chapter 10
Anti-fragility to Malware Spreading
To achieve anti-fragility to malware spreading, this chapter applies the fail fast prin-
ciple from Chap. 4 to the robust malware-halting technique developed in the two
previous chapters. According to the fail fast principle, it is necessary to learn from
failures in complex adaptive systems when the impact of the failures are still small.
In the case of infectious malware epidemics, once malware is detected on a node in a
networked system, other nodes infected by the same malware should be healed and
susceptible nodes should be protected from future infections of this malware.
The two previous chapters showed how software diversity and hub immunization
could halt malicious software or malware from spreading. This chapter combines
compiler-generated software diversity [24, 56, 89], hub immunization, and imperfect
malware detection/removal to achieve anti-fragility to the spreading of various types
of malware in networked computing systems. The cloud is used to efficiently combine
these techniques. The suggested malware-halting technique scales to huge networks
because it does not require any tightly coupled interactions or adaptations between
groups of devices. The average fraction of infected nodes is reduced compared to
the examples in Chap. 8. The technique is of practical interest because malware is an
omnipresent and serious security threat [21, 22]. The ideas in this chapter were first
presented in [90].
We again study infectious malware, that is, computer worms with different spread-
ing mechanisms. E-mail malware spreading via address lists and mobile phone mal-
ware propagating over short-range wireless links generate patterns of infected devices
defined by sparse graphs [85], while malware scanning Internet protocol version 4
(IPv4) addresses at random produce dense graphs. We concentrate on sparse spread-
ing networks in this chapter. Rather than trying to accurately model the spreading
of real malware instances, we again analyze worst-case spreading where the first
attempt to infect a susceptible device always succeeds.
Non-infectious malware strains, such as trojans, spyware, adware, and ran-
somware, mistakenly downloaded by computer users are viewed as infectious mal-
ware with limited spreading ability. We measure malware spreading in a networked
computing system by the fraction of infected devices. A system is fragile to malware
when small outbreaks of different malware strains spread to a large fraction of the
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devices. If the malware strains only spread to a small fraction of the devices, then
the system is robust. A system under repeated attacks from malware is anti-fragile
if it first learns to reduce the fraction of infected devices and then manages to keep
the fraction small when the malware’s spreading mechanism changes.
To achieve anti-fragility in practice, it is advantageous to build on existing and
planned automated software mechanisms. We combine compiler-generated diver-
sity, software downloads from application stores, hub immunization, and imperfect
malware detection/removal to achieve anti-fragility to malware spreading. An agent-
based model randomly adds software diversity to a software monoculture to create
a software polyculture with a much reduced fraction of infected devices. The model
demonstrates that periodically removing executable code, including unknown mal-
ware, from devices and installing new diverse code drastically increase robustness
to malware spreading. If imperfect malware detection is added, the model gains a
degree of anti-fragility because it can more quickly remove malware and update
vulnerable code to keep the fraction of infected devices very small, even when the
malware strains have unknown and time-varying spreading.
10.1 System Model
As in the two previous chapters, we study a network of interconnected computing
devices and consider the devices at the operating system (OS) and application levels.
Application stores in the cloud, such as Google Play and iOS App Store, utilize
compilers with “diversity engines” to generate binary images for a huge number of
devices, producing many different executable images from a much smaller set of
OSs and application source codes [24, 89]. As in earlier chapters, we assume that a
program’s many binary images can be divided into classes such that all members of
the same class have a common exploitable vulnerability, while members of different
classes have no common exploitable vulnerabilities.
The number of classes measures the program’s diversity, assuming roughly
equally large classes. Since compiler-driven diversity promises to provide large diver-
sity [24, 77], we forgo any notion of central control over the assignment of software
diversity to computing platforms and make no attempt to minimize the use of diver-
sity. This allows us to study the benefit of software diversity in systems with millions
of devices. Cloud-based compilations of source codes allow application stores to
support large numbers of download requests each day.
A significant fraction of all malware infections is not discovered by traditional
signature-based malware detection because modern malware utilizes time-varying
code obfuscation to avoid detection based on fixed byte patterns [21]. Emerging
cloud-based anti-malware solutions promise to improve automated malware detec-
tion [22, 91, 92]. Servers in the cloud deploy heuristic, behavioral, and signature-
based techniques to detect different types of malware by processing data collected
by clients running on user devices. A cloud solution can also incorporate knowledge
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from other sources, such as malware honeypots, that is, computers capturing mal-
ware.
Despite the protection promised by cloud anti-malware, it is nearly impossible to
keep all computing devices in a networked system free from malware at all times. The
difficulty of detecting encrypted malicious traffic and the successful use of rootkits
to hide malware suggest that automated malware detection will remain imperfect for
the foreseeable future [21]. A more realistic goal is to provide a form of “community
immunity,” where most devices are protected against malware because there is little
opportunity for outbreaks to spread. Whereas community immunity usually entails
the immunization of nearly all entities in a population, we mainly deploy compiler-
generated software diversity to reduce malware spreading. Our goal is not to force
the fraction of infected devices to zero but, rather, to keep it very low over time.
We study consecutive outbreaks of different malware types, called multimalware
outbreaks, because the deployment of multiple malware types is an obvious strategy
to counter software diversity. Devices are assumed to automatically remove exe-
cutable code, including unknown malware, and immediately download new diverse
code from application stores on a semi-regular basis. The introduction of imper-
fect malware detection allows devices to also initiate unscheduled code removal and
updates when infections are detected. In severe but rare cases, trained personnel must
take a device offline to wipe its entire memory before installing the new software. The
following model assumes that the self-repairing and diversity-enhancing approach
removes all malware. Because it is hard to remove advanced malware, especially
rootkits, from real systems, it is possible to adjust how often the model successful
carries out code removals and updates.
10.1.1 Model Description
We model multimalware spreading over networked computing devices by a simple
graph (no self-loops or parallel edges) with N nodes and a maximum of L node types
for L  N . At time step t = 0, 1, . . . , the graph contains D = D(t) of the L node
types, where D(0) = 1. The D active node types represent classes of binary codes at
the OS or application level of the devices’ computing platforms; that is, nodes of the
same type share an exploitable vulnerability while nodes of different types have
no common exploitable vulnerabilities. The edges represent virtual communica-
tion lines. The number of active node types D measures the model’s time-varying
diversity.
Two nodes are neighbors if there is an edge between them. A node’s degree k
is the number of neighbors and 〈k〉 is the average degree over all nodes. All nodes
change type with probability p at each time step to model the automated removal of
executable code (including unknown malware), followed by immediate downloads of
new diverse code from application stores. One of the L possible node types is selected
with probability 1/L , thus changing the initial monoculture into a polyculture with
diversity L .
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Initially, all nodes are susceptible to malware infections. There is one malware
type per node type. All malware types have the same spreading mechanism. Whereas
epidemiological models in the literature tend to model a single malware outbreak, we
model systems with many outbreaks. One malware outbreak occurs with probability
q at each time step. An outbreak initially infects a single susceptible node selected
uniformly at random. A newly sick node infects all its susceptible neighbors of the
same type during the next time step. Infected nodes change type with probability
r at each time step to model the varying degree of imperfect malware detection
followed by immediate malware removal and the installation of new diverse code.
Any infected node becomes susceptible when it changes type.
It is possible to switch off automated malware detection by setting r = 0. We
can also set p = 0 to disable automated software downloads. A small fraction of
nodes can be immunized, that is, made resistant to malware infections. Immunized
nodes do not change type or transmit infections to neighbors. As stated in Chap. 8,
automated immunization or hardening includes the removal of non-essential software
programs, the secure configuration of remaining programs, constant patching, and the
use of firewalls and intrusion prevention systems. Other mitigation techniques, such
as control-flow integrity [93], that induce code overhead and performance penalties
can also be used on selected devices.
10.1.2 Model Limitations
As first observed in Chap. 8, it is hard to predict how malware will spread over a
networked computing system because the propagation depends on the malware’s
spreading mechanism, the network topology, changing traffic loads, routing and fil-
tering policies, the choice of communication protocols, and network failures and
misconfigurations. Rather than trying to generate accurate spreading patterns under
various network conditions, the model displays very fast worst-case malware spread-
ing in which an infectious node immediately infects all its neighbors of the same
type.
Although the model cannot predict spreading in a real networked system, it can
demonstrate the usefulness of combining software diversity and imperfect malware
detection to halt malware spreading. Compared to the model, actual malware is likely
to spread slower, because the first attempt to infect a susceptible computing device
will not always succeed and not all susceptible devices will be infected because
some are unreachable in practice. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that modeled
malware halting translates into halting in real systems.
We only study sparse spreading patterns with an average degree 〈k〉 much lower
than the number of nodes N . Whereas nodes and edges can be deleted during a model
run and new nodes and edges added to simulate changes in the malware’s spreading
mechanism, nodes cannot change position after they have been created.
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10.2 Anti-fragility on Static Graphs
A worst-case spreading pattern given by a network with average degree 〈k〉 is homo-
geneous when all nodes have degrees k ≈ 〈k〉. To keep the analysis manageable,
we first study static spreading patterns represented by homogeneous networks and
determine when the system model is anti-fragile to spreading.
Consider a homogeneous network with a single node type at time t = 0, D(0) = 1.
If this monoculture is connected, then it is extremely fragile to malware spreading
since a single sick node will infect all nodes as long as no node changes type. The
model avoids fragile monocultures by allowing nodes to change type. Each time a
node changes type, it selects a particular type with probability 1/L . Consequently,
the number of node types D(t) will grow toward the maximum value L . The phase
where D(t) changes from one to L will be simulated later. Here, we assume that
D(t) = L , where t > t ′ for a small finite time t ′, and study the model after the
fraction of infected nodes starts to fluctuate around a small time-averaged value f .
We need to determine an expression for the time-averaged fraction f of infected
nodes. Let Q denote the set of susceptible nodes that are infected during T time
steps. We first estimate the expected number of infected nodes in Q, denoted E{|Q|}.
During each time step, there is a probability q that a single susceptible node is seeded
with an infection. The probability that no neighboring node has the same type as
this seed is approximately (1 − 1/L)〈k〉. If we choose a large diversity L > 〈k〉
such that this probability is large, then an infection will most likely spread at most
from the seed to the nearest neighbors of the same type. Ignoring further spreading,
each seed infects, on average, 〈k〉/L < 1 of its neighbors. Over T time steps, the
expected number of seeds is T · q and about T · q · 〈k〉/L susceptible neighbors will
be infected, since the average fraction f of infected nodes is small. The expected
number of susceptible nodes becoming infected during the period T is thus estimated
by E{|Q|} ≈ T · q · (1 + 〈k〉/L).
Next, we determine the expected number of infected nodes that become suscepti-
ble during T time steps. All N nodes in a network change type with probability p to
model periodic downloads of diverse software. Let P denote the set of infected nodes
that change type (and become susceptible) due to periodic software downloads. We
need to determine the expected size of P , denoted E{|P|}. The expected number of
type changes over a period T is p · N · T . Since the fraction of infected nodes is f ,
the expected number of infected nodes that change type is E{|P|} = f · p · N · T .
The remaining infected nodes at a time step detect their infections with probabil-
ity r . Let R be the set of infected nodes that change type (and become susceptible) due
to malware detection followed by an immediate software download. We also need to
determine the expected size E{|R|}. The expected number of infected nodes is f ·N ·T
and the expected number of infected nodes changing type is E{|R|} = r · f · N · T .
Over T time steps, the two sets P and R overlap. The total number of unique
nodes changing type and becoming susceptible is given by the union P ∪ R. The
expected size is of this union is E{|P ∪ R|} = E{|P|} + E{|R|} − E{|P ∩ R|} =
p f N T + r f N T − pr f N T = f N T (p + r − pr). The expected number of nodes
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changing type and becoming susceptible must be equal to the expected number of
new infected nodes to maintain a stable time-averaged fraction f of infected nodes.
Hence, the relation E{|P ∪ R|} = E{|Q|} results in the approximation
f ≈ q [1 + 〈k〉/L]
(p + r − pr)N (10.1)
for homogeneous networks with diversity L > 〈k〉.
Equation (10.1) shows that it is possible to maintain a small fraction f of infected
nodes, even if malware detection is switched off (r = 0), by adjusting the software
download probability p. Note that this property is based on the assumption that
malware is removed during the software update process. Let p and r be small such
that the value of pr is negligible compared to p + r . When malware detection is
switched on (r > 0), the fraction of infected nodes reduces further for a fixed
probability p. Hence, anti-fragile systems using imperfect detection and removal
of new malware further reduce the fraction of infected devices, compared to robust
systems that merely remove old code and download new diverse code periodically.
10.2.1 Simulations of Anti-fragility on Static Networks
To validate Eq. (10.1), we consider smartphones and other handheld computing
devices that communicate via short-range Wi-Fi and Bluetooth links [85]. Infectious
malware types can copy themselves to new devices by opening wireless connec-
tions. Malware can also propagate directly between Wi-Fi access points via wireless
connections [94]. We represent the worst-case spreading patterns by homogeneous
proximity networks. The system model was programmed in NetLogo [46] and gen-
erates a proximity network with average node degree 〈k〉 by first placing N nodes
uniformly at random on a square. An edge is then added between a randomly cho-
sen node and its closest neighbor in Euclidean distance. More edges are similarly
added until the network has the desired average degree. Self-loops and multiple edges
between nodes are not allowed.
Simulations were run on networks with N = 5,000 nodes, L = 20 node types, and
different average degrees 〈k〉. The outbreak probability was q = 10−2, the software
download probability p = 10−5, and the malware detection probability r = 10−3.
Table 10.1 lists the observed average, minimum, and maximum fraction of infected
nodes over 100 runs, where each value was averaged over the last 10,000 time steps
of a run. The table also reports an estimate of the average fraction obtained from
Eq. (10.1). The good agreement between the simulated and calculated values shows
that the expression can provide good estimates of the average fraction of infected
nodes. Other model runs with different parameter values confirm the agreement
between simulated and calculated values.
10.2 Anti-fragility on Static Graphs 105
Table 10.1 The estimated average fractions of infected nodes in proximity networks with 5,000
nodes and increasing average node degree
Proximity networks
Average degree 5 6 7 8
Estimated frac. 0.25 % 0.26 % 0.27 % 0.28 %
Simulated frac. 0.26 % 0.27 % 0.28 % 0.30 %
(max., min.) (+0.09,−0.08) (+0.08,−0.1) (+0.11,−0.07) (+0.16,−0.11)
The corresponding simulated fractions are averaged over 100 runs, with the largest observed devi-
ations shown in parentheses
10.2.2 Anti-fragility on Large Static Networks
Since there is agreement between the average fractions of infected nodes obtained
from the simulations and from Eq. (10.1), we use the equation to study anti-fragility
to malware spreading on very large homogeneous networks. The required frequency
of software download p and the frequency of malware detection r decrease as the
size of a network grows, because p + r is proportional to 1/N . Hence, anti-fragility
to malware occurs on large model networks for practical download and detection fre-
quencies.
Consider a homogeneous network with 100 million nodes, that is, N = 108, and
average degree 〈k〉  L . For outbreak frequency q = 10−2 and an average fraction of
infected nodes f = 10−3, we have from Eq. (10.1) that p + r ≈ q/( f N ) = 10−7. If
each time step in the model is one second long, then there is a new malware outbreak
every 100 seconds, on average. The fraction of infected nodes is maintained when
the download frequency is p ≈ 10−7 without malware detection (r = 0), that is, each
device has to download and install new software after about 116 days. If malware
detection is added to our example, then the average fraction of infected devices is
reduced. For r = 10−4 and p = 10−7, we have f ≈ 10−6. The calculations illustrate
that anti-fragility to malware spreading scales to very large homogeneous networks.
10.3 Anti-fragility on Time-Varying Graphs
We now consider a modified system model with an unknown and time-varying worst-
case spreading pattern that remains sparse over time. Even if the spreading mecha-
nism varies, the spreading is mostly limited to the neighbors of the nodes seeded with
infections as long as the spreading pattern remains homogeneous and the diversity
remains much larger than the changing average degree.
We therefore study inhomogeneous spreading patterns containing a small fraction
of nodes, called hubs, with degree kh much larger than the time-varying average
degree. A hub and its kh neighbors form a star graph with the hub at the center. If
all kh + 1 nodes have a uniform distribution of L node types, then there are roughly
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kh/L neighbors of the same type as the hub. A susceptible hub is infected each time
one of the neighbors of the same type is infected. A reinfected hub again infects all
susceptible neighbors of the same type, ensuring a total of kh/L infected neighbors.
Since a hub’s kh neighbors constitute a significant fraction of all nodes in a worst-
case spreading pattern, we may very well have kh 	 L . This is why hubs are
referred to as super-spreaders, even in software polycultures. Note that malware
does not need to be infectious for a hub to be a super-spreader; for example, a hub
can be a popular website infected by malware that is inadvertently downloaded by
many users accessing the site. While the non-infectious malware does not spread any
further after the downloads, the number of infected devices kh/L is still large.
Similarly, if the hubs’ neighbors tend to have small degrees, most of the spreading
of infectious malware will also be confined to the hubs’ neighbors. Even when a hub
regularly changes type, there will still be roughly kh/L neighbors of the same type as
long as all nodes have a uniform distribution of types. Over time, a hub that changes
type will reinfect many neighbors as long as at least a few neighbors of different
types are infected.
If hubs are connected in a small subnetwork and several hubs have the same type,
then a large fraction of all nodes in a worst-case spreading network is infected very
quickly. Hence, we need to “neutralize” hubs, especially tightly connected hubs, to
make the actual spreading pattern more homogeneous such that, for any susceptible
node of degree k, the expected number of neighbors of the same type is negligible
(k/L  1).
The following three malware simulations with different spreading patterns show
that hubs can be immunized to gain anti-fragility to multimalware spreading. Rather
than presenting plots averaged over many runs to obtain smooth curves, the figures
plot single runs to better demonstrate how anti-fragile systems would actually behave.
10.3.1 Simulations of Anti-fragility
In the first simulation, the NetLogo model generates a time-varying spreading pattern.
A model run starts with a proximity network with 2,000 nodes, average degree
〈k〉 = 4, maximum degree 10, and diversity D(0) = 1. Initially, malware detection
is turned off (r = 0). The fraction of infected nodes plotted in Fig. 10.1 reduces from
about 91 to 8 % as the model changes from a fragile monoculture to a more robust
polyculture with diversity L = 5. When malware detection is turned on (r = 10−2),
the fraction reduces further to 0.1 %. The plot confirms the advantage of introducing
software diversity and applying imperfect malware detection.
Next, 75 % of the nodes and their adjacent edges are deleted and the network is
regrown using the preferential attachment technique [95], with each new node con-
nected to three existing nodes. The new nodes have a uniform distribution of node
types. This simulated change in spreading mechanism causes the original homoge-
neous spreading pattern to change into an inhomogeneous spreading pattern. The
new spreading pattern has an average degree 〈k〉 = 4.8 and a maximum degree 33.
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Fig. 10.1 The fraction of infected nodes in a changing network with 2,000 nodes, outbreak prob-
ability q = 10−2, download probability p = 10−3, and diversity L = 5. The plot illustrates
the effects of increasing diversity, malware detection, a change in spreading mechanism, and hub
immunization
The fraction of infected nodes increases to roughly 45 % because the diversity L
is not large enough to prevent spreading from the new hubs, even though malware
detection is still on. The sharp increase in the fraction of infected nodes illustrates that
the malware halting is fragile to changes in the spreading pattern when the diversity
is too small.
Finally, the 61 nodes with the largest degrees are immunized. When these hubs and
their adjacent edges are ignored because they no longer contribute to malware spread-
ing, the remaining spreading pattern has average degree 〈k〉 = 3.8 and maximum
degree 14. The fraction of infected nodes reduces to roughly 0.6 %, demonstrating
the need to immunize super-spreaders in real networks to obtain more homogeneous
spreading patterns.
In the second simulation, the NetLogo model starts with an inhomogeneous email
network with 1,133 nodes, average degree 〈k〉 = 9.6, maximum degree 71, and diver-
sity L = 8. The largest hubs are immunized before the model run starts. As shown
in Fig. 10.2, the fraction of infected nodes reduces to roughly 1 % as the monocul-
ture turns into a polyculture. The model then erases 75 % of all nodes as before and
creates an inhomogeneous network with 2,000 nodes. No new nodes are immunized
and their types are uniformly distributed. The new subgraph of susceptible nodes has
average degree 〈k〉 = 4.7 and maximum degree 44. Unlike in the first simulation,
there is no large change in the fraction of infected nodes in Fig. 10.2 because the
diversity, the remaining immunized nodes, and the malware detection probability
(r = 10−2) together prevent significant spreading. The plot shows that the malware
halting can be made robust to changes in the spreading pattern.
In the third simulation, the NetLogo model utilizes a static inhomogeneous spread-
ing pattern with 10,670 nodes, 36 hubs that form a small connected subgraph, and
many nodes with a low degree k ≈ 〈k〉 = 4.1. The hubs’ degrees range from
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Fig. 10.2 The fraction of infected nodes in a time-varying e-mail network with outbreak probability
q = 10−2, download probability p = 10−3, malware detection probability r = 10−2, and diversity
L = 8. Note that there is no visible change in the fraction when the spreading network changes
2,312 down to 102. In a real network, any immunization of hubs is likely to be
imperfect because some infected hubs are not detected or because some hardened
hubs still become infected. The model utilizes acquaintance immunization to simu-
late imperfect cloud-based detection and immunization of infected hubs [25]. This
immunization technique chooses a set of nodes uniformly at random and immunizes
one arbitrary neighbor per node. While the original set of nodes is unlikely to contain
the few hubs in the network, the randomly selected neighbors are much more likely
to be hubs, since many edges are adjacent to high-degree nodes.
Figure 10.3 plots the fraction of infected nodes. The fraction decreases as the
diversity grows to L = 14 but stabilizes around 11 % because the hubs are not
immunized. When acquaintance immunization selects 2 % of the nodes, all but three
Fig. 10.3 The fraction of infected nodes in a static network with 10,670 nodes, outbreak probability
q = 10−1, download probability p = 10−3, malware detection probability r = 10−3, and diversity
L = 14
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of the hubs are immunized. The fraction of infected nodes reduces to about 0.1 %.
Figure 10.3 illustrates that imperfect detection and immunization of hubs reduce the
fraction of infected nodes, even when the spreading pattern contains a subnetwork
of tightly connected hubs.
Additional simulations with varying parameter values confirm the model behav-
ior reported. In particular, simulations using acquaintance immunization confirm
the adequacy of imperfect hub immunization. The additional simulations further
strengthen the claim that compiler-generated software diversity, periodic down-
loads of software from application stores, and imperfect malware detection/removal
together provide a networked computing system with a degree of anti-fragility to
multimalware spreading.
10.4 Discussion
The anti-fragile malware-halting technique scales to large networked systems because
compiler-generated software diversity and malware detection can be implemented
as cloud services. While empirical work is needed to determine the real-world per-
formance of the combined services, it is encouraging that there exist commercial
anti-malware solutions running in the cloud. According to Franz’s research group
[24, 89], it is cost-effective to compile diverse software in the cloud. Furthermore, the
impact of software diversity on the runtime performance is small and it is possible
to securely patch diverse software. Still, challenges remain.
While acquaintance immunization is useful for simulating imperfect detection
and immunization of hubs, the strategy is not the best choice for real networked sys-
tems, because many potential super-spreaders, such as popular websites, are known.
The challenge is to ensure that the owners of potential super-spreaders harden their
systems. Users could be warned to stay away from infected websites, making it nec-
essary for owners to remove the malware and harden the systems to get their users
back. At the time of this writing, Google informs users and webmasters of unsafe
websites (http://google.com/transparencyreport/safebrowsing).
Netflix’s decision to induce failures in their production system to repeatedly
increase robustness to downtime raises the question of whether to use infectious
“goodware” to improve the detection of susceptible devices and speed up the learn-
ing process leading to anti-fragility to malware spreading. While ethical questions
are associated with this approach, it is worth investigating.
Although users today regularly download software from application stores, more
work is needed to create self-repairing (up to a point) devices that remove malware
and install diverse software in a way acceptable to users.
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What to learn from Part III
Part III analyzed how to prevent infectious malware from spreading over huge
networks of computing devices. Through a series of analyses, we developed
a malware-halting technique that stops frequent multimalware outbreaks with
an unknown and time-varying spreading mechanism. The technique combines
application stores with compiler-generated software diversity, imperfect mal-
ware detection, and the semi-periodic reinstallation of software on devices. If
compiler-generated software diversity and malware detection are realized in the
cloud, then the malware-halting technique scales to huge networks, because it
does not require any tightly coupled interactions or adaptations between groups
of computing devices.
More efficient malware-halting techniques exist that require less software
diversity to halt malware outbreaks on spreading networks with known and
unchanging topologies. The problem with these techniques is that the topologies
of spreading networks are rarely known in practice. Furthermore, the topologies
change over time as the malware writers change the spreading mechanisms.
Finally, the previously known techniques require a high degree of central con-
trol, limiting the ability to scale to millions of devices. To ensure scaling, we
relinquished central control and made a strategical decision to not let the perfect
be the enemy of the good. Hence, instead of trying to minimize the needed soft-
ware diversity, we focused on creating a simple technique that takes advantage
of existing and proposed technologies to halt frequent multimalware outbreaks
with unknown and changing spreading mechanisms.
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